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"HOW CONFIDENTIAL IS THIS CONVERSATION
ANYWAY?": DISCOVERABILITY OF EXCULPATORY
MATERIALS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 1996, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the difficult issue of balancing defendants' access to victims'
privileged documents in sexual assault cases.' In Massachusetts, an absolute statutory privilege of nondisclosure protects against discovery of confidential documents in sexual assault cases.2 The Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, however, provide defendants the right to access material
to prepare a thorough defense. 3 To protect each parties' rights, the Supreme Judicial Court instituted a balancing test.4 The court's test requires
weighing the sexual assault victims' statutorily protected privacy interest
and a defendants' conflicting right to a fair trial under state and federal
constitutions. 5

1See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 227 n.9, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 n.9
(1996) (modifying both procedure and standard which defendants must satisfy before
gaining access to witnesses' privileged records). The Fullerdecision modifies stage two of
the five stage procedure outlined in Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d
990 (1993), by which judges must determine a defendant's constitutional rights to access
privileged documents. Id.; Cf. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 181-82, 617
N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (1993).
2 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, §20J (1996) (providing sexual assault
victims an
absolute privilege against disclosure of confidential information).
3See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MASS. CONST. of 1780, part the first, art.
XII
(1780). The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4See Bishop, 416 Mass. at 177 (recognizing a need to balance competing interests);
Fuller, 423 Mass. at 223 (maintaining balance between defendants' rights and victims'
rights of nondisclosure).
5See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 176, 617 N.E.2d 169, 994-95
(1993) (recognizing under certain circumstances defendant must have access to privileged
materials).

In Massachusetts, a balancing test was created "so as not to undermine the

confidence in the outcome of trial."

ld; see also Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397

Mass. 261, 266, 491 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1986) (finding statutorily based privilege must,
under certain circumstances, yield to the defendant's constitutional rights).

66

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol.

m

Part one of this article addresses the conflicting interests of a sexual
assault victim and a criminal defendant. Statutory and constitutional arguments support the existence of a testimonial privilege between a sexual
assault counselor and his or her patient. 6 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses establishes a defendant's right to properly prepare his or her defense.7 This article argues
that defendants' constitutionally recognized right to gather evidence
should, at limited times, yield to victims' right to preserve the confidential
nature of the counselor-patient relationship.
Part two examines Massachusetts' approach to balancing these conflicting rights. Massachusetts' current approach attempts to balance both
parties' interests in confidential documents.8 Today, an incamera review
of all materials potentially relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt protects the confidentiality of the counselor-patient relationship while affording the defendant a right to prepare a thorough defense. Requiring a defendant to prove that privileged documents contain potentially exculpatory
information relevant and material to his or her guilt provides victims with
greater protection against routine disclosure of confidential information.
II. BALANCING THE INTERESTS: VICTIM V. DEFENDANT

A. Establishinga Privilege
Testimonial privilege, by definition, excludes certain documents from
the fact finder and may impair the truth seeking duty of our judicial system. 9 The Federal Rules of Evidence adopted a general rule concerning
6 See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 217, 222, 667 N.E.2d 847, 849, 852-

53 (1996) (recognizing both Massachusetts' absolute statutory protection and federal case
law supporting non-disclosure of personal matters); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599 (1977) (finding federal precedent supports an individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of private information).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosectuions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...."
ld; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (holding a state statute that prevents
the defendant from impeaching a witness' credibility violates the Confrontation Clause);
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (stating defendants' compulsory process
right to put forth evidence that may influence the determination of guilt).
8 See generally Fuller,423 Mass. 216, 667 N.E.2d 847.
9See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S 683, 709 (1974) (finding compulsory
process
fundamental to adversary system). In Nixon, the Court held that the government's goal of
producing evidence in a criminal trial outweighed the President's claim of absolute privilege
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testimonial privilege allowing each state to individually identify which relationships to protect.'l
Under Rule 501, each state may extend nonconstitutionally based privileges to those relationships which the state recognizes as beneficial." Therefore, state statute and12common law have
long recognized certain specific testimonial privileges.
Testimonial privileges, whether constitutionally or statutorily based,
may be analyzed by considering those elements Dean Henry Wigmore recognized as necessary to establish a privilege.' 3 The four elements include:

over relevant documents. Id. The Nixon court stated that "[t]he very integrity of the judicial
system... depend[s] on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence." Id. See also Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966) (recognizing
that "disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of justice").
10 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (1996). Rule 501 states in pertineant
part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority,the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the Unites States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person or government, State or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State Law.
Id.
I See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 88 (1973) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7082
(recognizing that "federal law should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas
such as privilege absent a compelling reason"). The House Judiciary Committee reasoned
that in non-diversity based federal cases there was no compelling federal interest to depart
from a state's policy. Id. Additionally, the interest in avoiding forum shopping led the
Committee to support the general rule in favor of state created non-constitutionally based
privileges. Id.
12 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20J (1996) (establishing
an absolute
sexual assault-counselor privilege); Id. § 20K (1996) (protecting domestic violencecounselor privilege); Id. § 20A (1986) (recognizing priest-penitent confidentiality). See
also Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (1982)
(recognizing a privilege in social worker-client relationship). The Collett court reasoned
that"[t]he purpose of enacting a... privilege is to prevent the chilling effect which routine
disclosures may have in preventing those in need of help from seeking that help." Id. at
428.
'3 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE, CASES AND MATERIALS 1348 (8th ed. 1988)

(citing 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
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(1) the communication must originate in a confidence that it will not be
disclosed;
(2) the element of confidentiality must be essential to the full maintenance
of the relation between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be fostered; and
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit
that would be gained
14
thereby for the correct disposal of the litigation.
Wigmore's four elements justify the existence of the counselor-patient
privlege. First, a sexual assault victim seeks out the counselor's assistance
and enters into a contractual agreement whereby the victim discloses personal information to a counselor who agrees to hold the information in
confidence.' 5 The counselor-patient relationship satisfies the second element because the entire relationship depends upon the confidentiality between the parties. The public funding of counseling supports Wigmore's
third element. Community funded counseling in state and federal institutions such as prisons, schools and the armed forces as well as support for
the mental health needs of lower income persons demonstrates the importance accorded the relationship by society. 6 The fourth element goes to
the heart of the balancing test between the counselor-patient privilege and
the defendant's rights in a sexual assault case. Wigmore's utilitarian based
theory rests on the principle that the privilege will survive as long as its
benefits are greater than the potential harm to the truth seeking functions of
trial. This explains the impetus behind Massachusetts' development of the
balancing approach.17
All states currently recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege
growing out of the common law physician-patient privilege.'1 While some
statutes are conditional and provide enumerated exceptions allowing spe14 Id.
15 Anna Y. Joo, Broadening The Scope of Counselor-PatientPrivilege To Protect
The

Privacy Of The Sexual Assault Survivor, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 255, 259 (1995).
16 See id. (recognizing a contractual relationship at the core of the counselor-patient
privilege).
17 See id. A common criticism of Wigmore's elements suggests that Wigmore's
utilitarian principle "neglects the broader moral, ethical considerations and notions of
personal privacy that arguably underlie many of the privileges." WEINSTEIN, supra note
13 at 1348.
18See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
19 (1996).
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cific disclosure, others are absolute and facially deny access to a victim's
file by any person without the victim's consent.19 Massachusetts recognizes and extends an absolute testimonial privilege between sexual assault
victims and certain counselors. 20 Massachusetts' counselor-sexual assault
victim privilege offers the victim greater protection than other states by
protecting her conversations with a range of mental health professionals.2 '
This allows victims to seek assistance from a myriad of mental health professionals without compromising the confidentiality within that relationship.2 2
Most states which extend a testimonial privilege to the counselorpatient relationship premise the privilege on statutory or common law
principles.23 Although no states premise the privilege on a constitutional
24
right of privacy, some federal case law suggests such an interpretation.
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20J (1996) (providing an absolute
privilege to sexual assault counselor-patient communications); COLO. REV. STAT. Ch. 6 §
13-90-107(1)(g) (1996) (creating an absolute privilege within psychologist-patient
relationship); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 6339 (1996) (enumerating exceptions to child
abuse investigation statute).
20 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20J (1996). The statute defines a
sexual
assault counselor as:
a person who is employed by or is a volunteer in a rape crisis center, has
undergone thirty-five hours of training, who reports to and is under the direct
control and supervision of a licensed social worker, nurse, psychiatrist,
psychologist or psychotherapist and whose primary purpose is the rendering of
advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual assault.
Id.
21 See id. (defining sexual assault counselor broadly to include both licensed
and
trained professionals). See also UTAH R. EVID. 506 (1997) (extending privilege to
marriage and family therapists, professional counselors and mental health nurse specialists).
But see HAW. R. EVID. 504, 504(a)(1) (1995) (limiting privilege to physicians and
psychotherapists); N.D. R. EVID. 503 (1997) (limiting privilege to physicians and
psychotherapists).
22 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20J (1996).
23 See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 98 Md. App. 348, 365, 633 A.2d 455, 463 (1993)
19See,

(affirming a statutory privilege for the counselor-patient relationship and balancing
defendants constitutional right of disclosure); Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 523 Pa. 427, 433,
567 A.2d 1357, 1360 (1989) (Larsen, J. dissenting) (recognizing a common law privilege
between psychiatrist and patient); Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 26465, 491 N.E.2d 234, 237 (1986) (finding a statutory privilege for sexual assault-patient
relationships).
24 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (suggesting a zone
of
privacy could limit disclosure of privileged documents); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,
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In Jaffee v. Redmond,25 the Supreme Court recognized a "psychotherapist
privilege" under federal statutory law. 26 The Court found that Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence protected against the disclosure and discovery of confidential communications between a counselor and his or her
patient. 27
Two important interests support the need for a sexual assault counselor-patient privilege. 2 8 Statutes and common law define privileged relationships in an attempt "to protect citizens' private and personal confidences from unwarranted public scrutiny., 29 Primarily, the privilege encourages victims to seek professional assistance to cope with the psychological trauma of a sexual assault. 30 Sexual assault victims often have
1513 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the precise nature of a privacy right "is rather ill
defined"); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing a
right of privacy in a doctor-patient relationship founded on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93
S. Ct. 705 (1973)); Cf.Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 223 n.6, 667 N.E.2d 853
n.6 (1996) (doubting future validity of Mountanos decision). The Fuller court criticized the
Mountanos decision for extending the patient-psychotherapist privilege under the privacy
doctrine as established in Roe v. Wade. Fuller,423 Mass. at 223 n.6. The Supreme Judicial
Court found that the Mountanos decision went beyond the reasoning of other courts and
premised the privilege on federal common law. Id. The court recognized that although
Mountanos establishes the privilege upon tenuous footing, the case recognized that this
conditional privilege must, at times, yield to a state's compelling interest in ensuring the
defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and compulsory process. Id.
25 Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
26 See id. The Court recognized that "protecting confidential communications between
a psychotherapist and her patient from involuntary disclosure, the proposed privilege thus
serves important private interests." Id. at 16.
27 Id. at 15-16.
28 See Fuller,423 Mass. at 221-22, 667 N.E.2d at 852 (1996)(recognizing a personal
and societal benefit); Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 24, 428 A.2d
126, 130 (1981) (hereinafter "PAAR") (finding a compelling public interest in assisting rape
victims). In PAAR the court recognized the "undoubtable" public interest in helping victims
to overcome their issues due to a sexual assault. Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape,
494 Pa. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130.
29 Ellen M. Crowley, In Camera Inspections Of PrivilegedRecords In Sexual
Assault
Trials: Balancing Defendants' Rights and State Interests Under Massachusetts'sBishop
Test, 21 AM. J.L & MED. 131, 131 (1995). The confidential relationship is privileged
through recognized statutory construction. ld.
30 See Fuller,423 Mass. at 221-22 (articulating beneficial reasons
for privilege). See
also Crowley supra note 28 at 160-61 (recognizing the need for confidential counseling to
combat rape trauma).
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feelings of shame, guilt, helplessness, fear, denial, anger and powerlessness, and sexual assault counselors act as critical agents in assisting vic3
tims to confront past traumatic experience in a supportive environment. 1
Secondly, a privilege of nondisclosure assists the state in reporting rape
crimes and their subsequent prosecution.32 The Court in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie33 recognized that as the likelihood of disclosure increases, the
number of victims seeking mental health care decreases. 34 Consequently,
the Court recognized both personal and public benefits as a result of the
confidential counselor-patient relationship.3 5
B. Defendant's ConstitutionalRights
In a sexual assault prosecution, the defendant has certain constitutionally protected rights to collect relevant evidence and to fully develop
his or her defense. 3 The constitutional guarantees of due process, confrontation, and compulsory process attempt to ensure the defendant a fair
trial.37 These constitutionally protected rights work to elevate public confidence in the criminal justice system by providing a procedurally
exact
38
process which guarantees certain rights to every defendant.
Within the compulsory process clause, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution has a fundamental right to discover potentially exculpatory
31

See Joo supra note 15 at 264 (arguing counselor-patient privilege should guarantee

confidentiality in most circumstances). Sexual assault counselors assist the victim to
confront her trauma, rebuild self esteem, obtain medical treatment for injuries, and
encourage the victim to prosecute the perpetrator of the offense. Id. at 265-66.
32 See Fuller, 423 Mass. at 221-22; see also Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against
Rape, 494 Pa. at 24, 428 A.2d at 130 (1981).
33 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
34See id. The Court recognized that full disclosure of confidential records to
defense
counsel "could have a seriously adverse effect on ... efforts to uncover and treat abuse." Id.
at 60.
Id.
36 See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
37See Joo, Broadening the Scope, supra note 15 at 267 (recognizing defendant's
constitutional rights). Joo outlines the state's prosecutorial advantages and the need to
ensure a defendant of his or her constitutional rights. Id. Joo recognizes that the
prosecution often has superior financial, procedural, political, psychological, and bargaining
power in a criminal case. Id. In an attempt to balance the defendant's position in a state
prosecution, Joo articulated the defendant's fundamental rights under the Sixth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. Id.
38See Developments in the Law 1450, 1543 (1985).

Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
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evidence.39
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause
provides similar procedural protections for an accused. The due process
clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court, however, offers a more fully
developed analysis in the area of sexual assault litigation. 4 The Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions, has examined the defendant's due process
rights in these situations. In Brady v. Maryland41 , the Court held that the
due process clause required the prosecution to disclose favorable evidence
to the accused. 42 The Court clarified its position regarding discovery of
exculpatory evidence in United States v. Agurs.43 The Agurs Court held
that a prosecutor was not required to turn over a victim's complete file as
part of routine discovery.44 Under the current standard, a court must determine whether the possible exculpatory material, if disclosed to the defendant, would change the proceeding's result. 45
In Davis v. Alaska46 , the Court solidified a defendant's confrontation
rights. 47 The Davis Court held that a state's interest in keeping juvenile
39See

Robert Weisberg, Defendant v. Witness:

Measuring Confrontation and
Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 935, 950 (1978); see also, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (holding
defendant's compulsory process right overrides state witness disqualification statute). Here,
the Court found that an individual's fundamental compulsory process rights were paramount
to a state law. Id.
40 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (reasoning compulsory
process
affords no greater protection than due process). The Ritchie Court chose to analyze the
issue of privileged records in a sexual assault case under due process grounds rather than
following the reasoning of the lower courts' compulsory process and confrontation
arguments. Id.
41

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

See id.(holding disclosure of evidence likely to exculpate a defendant was required
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 795 (1972) (recognizing no constitutional basis for full disclosure of evidence)
(emphasis added).
43 See generally United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
44 Id. at 109.
45 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985) (limiting prosecutors'
duty
42

to disclose evidence); see also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56 (recognizing defendant's right to put
forth evidence influencing guilt).
46 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974).
47See id.; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)
(recognizing
defendant's fundamental right of confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses).
The Confrontation Clause is made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. Pointer,380 U.S. at 403.
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records confidential must yield to a criminal defendant's right to confront
an adverse witness. 48 More recently, the Court recognized that a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was not included as a pretrial
tool for discovery. 49 The Court has recognized that the government may
limit a defendant's right to confront a witness where a compelling governmental interest exists.50
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie5', the Court balanced a state statutory
privilege and a defendant's constitutional right of due process.52 Charged
with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of
a minor, defendant Ritchie sought access to investigatory files regarding
his daughter, the complainant. 53 First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed the issue of a defendant's access to confidential information
protected by a state's conditional privilege statute.54 That court held that
415 U.S. at 320.

The Court recognized that a defendant's right of
confrontation by cross-examining adverse witnesses is a vital constitutional right. Id.
49 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987)(recognizing
the limits of the
confrontation clause).
50 Id.; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (recognizing
extent of
confrontation clause). The Fensterer Court articulated that a defendant's confrontation
right includes only an opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine an adverse witness. Id. The
defendant does not have the ability nor opportunity to effectuate a cross-examination "in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Id.
51 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987).
52 See id., 480 U.S. at 61 (holding that a trial judge's in camera review
balances
competing interests). The Court was asked to determine whether a Pennsylvania statute had
violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 42-43. Pennsylvania enacted a statute which provided
that, subject to eleven exceptions, all information obtained in a Children and Youth Services
(hereinafter "CYS") investigation was confidential. Id. at 43. The court found that
allowing a judge to conduct an in camera review of all evidence to determine its materiality
to the case served Ritchie's interest without destroying the state's interest in confidentiality.
Id. at 61.
53 Id. at 43. CYS refused to turn over the records and claimed a privilege pursuant
to
Pennsylvania law, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). In 1994,
the Pennsylvania legislature rewrote this section and it is now classified as 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6339 (1996)). The Ritchie decision recognized that the statute provided that
"all reports and other information obtained in the course of a CYS investigation must be
kept confidential, subject to 11 specific exceptions." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 61.
54 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (noting that statute includes eleven specific exceptions).
Ritchie was denied access to his daughter's counseling records under PA. STAT., tit. 11, §
2215 (a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58. The court limited its review to
conditional privilege statutes. Id. The court did not address statutes which provide an
48Davis,
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the defendant, through his attorney, had a right to go through the Children
and Youth Services (hereinafter "CYS") file to search for any potentially
exculpatory information.55 The Pennsylvania court reasoned that CYS's
claim of privilege violated the defendant's confrontation and compulsory
process rights to a fair trial. 56
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case and ordered the trial
judge to conduct an in-camera review of all potentially exculpatory evidence to determine its materiality, rather than allow the defense counsel
direct access to the material.
The Court analyzed the Ritchie decision
under the broader due process framework of fundamental fairness of trials. 58 Ritchie argued that he ought to have access "because the file might
contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other unspecified exculpatory evidence." 59 The Court found that Ritchie's due process rights
were preserved by permitting an in-camera review. 60 The Court reaffirmed a state's obligation to "turn over evidence in its possession that is
both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. ' 6 1 The
Court found that "[a]n in-camera review...will serve Ritchie's interest
without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality
of those involved in child-abuse investigations." 62

absolute privilege; therefore, it is uncertain whether a defendant may ever pierce an absolute
privilege and gain access to confidential documents. Id.at n. 14.
55 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 46
(1987).
56 Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that, in an adversarial
system, the
defendant has a right to access information which could be helpful to his defense. Id.In an
attempt to balance the countervailing interest of confidentiality in the CYS investigations,
the court recommended certain "appropriate steps" be taken when infringing that
confidentiality. See id.at 46, n. 6 (recognizing various judicial steps including protective
orders, or conducting certain proceedings in camera).
Id.at 61.
58

Id.at 56.

Id.at 44.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) (finding a right to discover
material information in preparing a defense). In balancing the defendant's and public's
60

interests the court stated that although. "we recognize that the public interest in protecting
this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily
prevents disclosure in all circumstances." Id.at 57.
61 See id. at 57; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, (1976)
(recognizing the
obligation to turn over favorable evidence to the accused).
62

Id. at61.
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The Court's decision specifically articulated that the facts of Ritchie
involved a conditional statutory privilege which provided eleven enumerated exceptions to the privilege. 63 The fact that the statute provided statutory exceptions aided the Court in rendering its decision to permit disclosure. 64 Limited to the issue concerning discovery of conditionally privileged materials, the Ritchie court specifically expressed
no opinion regard65
ing the discovery of absolutely privileged information.
In the past decade, more states have instituted absolute privileges
against disclosing counseling files. Some state legislatures have made attempts to construct an impenetrable testimonial privilege and protect the
66
confidential information arising out of the patient-counselor relationship.
Additionally, a few state courts have recognized that a defendant has no
constitutional right to discover absolutely privileged information. 67 In
their efforts to keep information covered by "absolute privilege" beyond
the scope of discovery, advocates argue that there is a compelling state interest in protecting victims confidential statements from the effects of pub63
64

Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 57. In its reasoning the court stated "[tihis is not a case where a state statute

grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all eyes." Id.
65 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58, n.14 (1987). The opinion stated "[wle
express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have been different if the statute
had protected the CYS files from disclosure to anyone.... Id.
66See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1(b)(1) (Purdon 1997) (recognizing
an absolute sexual assault counselor-patient), 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 518.802.1(3) (1996)
(finding a absolute rape crisis counselor-patient); 6 COLO. REV. STAT. §13-90-107(1)(g)
(1996) (holding psychologist-patient privilege as absolute).
67 See,e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson, 529 Pa. 268, 281, 602 A.2d
1290, 1297 (1992)
(outlining the victims rights under an absolute privilege); People v. Foggy, 121 111. 2d 337,
350, 521 N.E.2d 86, 92 (1988) (recognizing strong public policy in favor of confidentiality
requires non-disclosure or absolutely privilged materials); People v. District Court, 719
P.2d 722, 727 & n.3 (Colo. 1986) (holding post-assault psychotherapy records absolutely
privleged and only discoverable upon victim's assent and waiver). In Wilson, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania distinguished its decision from its previous holding in Ritchie.
Wilson, 529 Pa. at 281, 602 A.2d at 1297. The Wilson court found that an absolute
privilege, as distinguished from a conditional privilege outlined in Ritchie, prohibited all
disclosure absent the victim's consent. Id. The court held that an absolute privilege statute
did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. Id. In its reasoning, the Wilson court
found that the state's compelling interest in protecting the confidential communications
between rape counselor and patient did not offend the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.
The absolute privilege was broad in its application but narrowly drawn to achieve the state's
articulated goal of protecting the victim's privacy. Id.
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lic disclosure. The Supreme Court has not yet commented on the constitutionality
of an absolute privilege, and states remain split in their deci69
sions.
Il. MASSACHUSETTS' APPROACH
The Commonwealth's legislature and courts have attempted to balance the public's need to protect the counseling records of sexual assault
victims and the defendant's need to prepare a thorough defense. The development and implementation of the current balancing test as outlined in
Commonwealth v. Bishop70 and modified in Commonwealth v. Fuller7'
have endeavored to protect the valuable counselor-patient relationship
without impeding a defendant's constitutionally protected rights. 2
A. Developing a Balance
In 1986, the Massachusetts trial courts first balanced the competing
interests of a victim and a defendant in Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles.73
In Two Juveniles, the defendants' were charged with the aggravated rape
of an eighteen year old woman.74 Defense counsel moved the court for an
in camera inspection of communications between the victim and the hospital sexual assault counselor." The defense argued that the state's sexual

68 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-802.1 (3) and 2(c) (1993) (citing the intent of an

absolute privilege between rape counselor and patient).
69 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 480 U.S. 39, 58, n.14 (1987) (expressing no opinion
regarding absolute privileges); Wilson, 529 Pa. at 281, 602 A.2d at 1297 (recognizing state
absolute privilege against disclosing counselor records does not violate defendant's
constitutional rights); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 223, 667 N.E.2d 847, 853
(1996) (finding a non-constitutionally based privilege may yield to a defendant's
constitutional due process rights).
70 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993).
71423 Mass. 216, 667 N.E.2d 847 (1996).
72 See id. at 226 (holding defendant's threshold showing of materiality
required for an
in-camera review of a victim's privileged documents).
397 Mass. 261, 491 N.E.2d 234 (1986).
74 Id. at 263. The victim first saw a sexual assault counselor through a hospital's
rape
crisis center and then received medical treatment from the hospital's emergency unit. Id.
75 Id. The defense prepared a "written motion for inspection of 'c. 233 § 20J Hospital
Records' . . . to determine whether or not those materials contained exculpatory evidence."
Id. The trial court noted that the woman met the definitional requirements of a "victim"
under ch. 233 § 20J of Massachusetts General Laws. Id. at 263, n.2. Additionally the trial
court recognized that the "sexual assault counselor" and "rape crisis center" also satisfied
the state's statutory requirements. Id. The defenses motion first requested a judicial
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assault counselor privilege runs counter to the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and Article Twelve of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights.76 The Commonwealth argued against disclosure of
any absolutely privileged documents because of the victim's need to seek
confidential counseling after incidents of sexual assault.77 In its opinion,
the Supreme Judicial Court declined to comment concerning the statute's
constitutionality until the facts of a case "require an answer to the...
question. 7 8 Alternatively, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that ch. 233
§ 20J of the Massachusetts General Laws amounted to a nonconstitutionally based absolute privilege and where the "possibility that
protected communications might aid an accused is enough to require an in
camera inspection., 79 The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that, at times,
a victim's statutory rights "must yield at trial to the constitutional rights of
a criminal defendant... ,,80 Under this framework, a defendant, in certain
circumstances, may trump the rights of a victim to keep information private. 8
Under this standard, a defendant might obtain privileged information
under § 20J if he or she could demonstrate "a legitimate need" for the

inspection of the evidence alone. Id. at 263, n.3, 491 N.E.2d at 236, n.3. At the SJC
hearing, the defense argued that counsel must participate with the judge in the initial in
camera review of evidence. Id.
76 See id. at 262, 491 N.E.2d at 235 (articulating the issue presented to
the SJC). The
court was asked to rule whether the absolute prohibition against disclosure articulated in ch.
203 § 20J of the Massachusetts General Laws was contrary to the confrontation clauses of
the Sixth Amendment as well as the state's constitution. Id. Article Twelve of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states in pertinent part: "And every subject shall have
a right to produce all proofs, that may be favourable to him; to meet the witnesses against
him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his council, at his
election." MASS. CONST. art. XII § 1.
77 See Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 262, 491 N.E.2d at 235 (presenting the
question
for the court's review).
78 Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 264, 491
N.E.2d 234, 237
(1986).
79Id. at 266, 491 N.E.2d at 237-38 The SJC recognized that §20J encompassed an
absolute privilege and that an in camera review was not derived from an interpretation of
§20J. The SJC reasoned that an in camera review of documents held under an absolute
privilege may be permitted because of a "constitutional right which transcends the statute
and requires the courts to fashion an exception to the statute ..... Id. at 264.
80
81

Id. at 266
Id.
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documents.8 2 The Supreme Judicial Court placed the burden on the defense to show the court a legitimate need existed for access to the privileged communications. 83 After a judge determined the material's necessity, she would conduct an independent in camera review of all records
satisfying the "legitimate need" standard8 4
In its reasoning, the court failed to articulate a standard by which the
defense could meet this threshold showing of legitimacy. Instead, the Supreme Judicial Court articulated a general threshold and reasoned that each
conflict between a victim's privilege and a defendant's constitutional
rights must be resolved according to its own facts.85 The Supreme Judicial
Court's failure to articulate a clear standard left the trial courts to independently decide if a defendant meets their burden of proving a legitimate
need.
In Commonwealth v. Stockhammer8 6 , the Supreme Judicial Court revisited the issue of balancing a defendant's rights with a victim's privilege.87 In Stockhammer, the defendant sought, and the trial judge ordered,
the "production of any and all records of psychotherapist or counselors
who treated the complainant ....,, After the Judge conducted an8 9incamera review of the records, they were denied admittance as evidence.
In Stockhammer, the Supreme Judicial Court introduced a new procedural element, abandoning the standard previously outlined in Two Juveniles.9° In its decision to permit defense counsel to view the privileged
82

Id. at 269.

The court stated that information needed only for a possible

impeachment of credibility would not be inspected. Id. at 268. The SJC felt that if it
permitted the defendant to discover possible impeachment evidence then it would
"substantially destroy the privilege." Id. Also, evidence which is unavailable from another
source "will not be sufficient to establish a legitimate need." Id.
83 Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 269, 491 N.E.2d
234, 239 (1986)
(articulating standard defense must meet prior to in camera review of documents).
84 Id. The judge will be responsible for determining evidence demonstrating
the
witness' bias or motive to lie in addition to factual statements. Id. at 269, n.7.
85 See id. (rejecting a clear test to determine legitimacy of defendant's claim for access
to privileged communication).
86 409 Mass. 867, 883, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1002 (1991).
87 Id.(distinguishing present case as a qualified privilege rather than an absolute
privilege).
88 Id. The documents were ordered to be produced before an in camera inspection
took place. Id.
89 Id. The court's decision expressed no opinion why the evidence was not admitted.
90Id.at

884 (permitting defense to review records prior to judicial in camera review).
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documents prior to in-camera review, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned
that a judge could not act as both an effective adjudicator and advocate. 91
The court held that Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights guarantees a defendant the confrontation right to inspect privileged
records.92 Although the court liberalized the procedure by which defense
could gain access to privileged records, the Stockhammer decision never
expressly removed the requirement that the defense must93 prove the
"legitimate need" for the records as outlined in Two Juveniles.
In its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the state constitution more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the
94
due process rights guaranteed to defendants in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the Court's position in Ritchie that a
judge could effectively play the role of advocate while privately viewing
the evidence during an in camera review. 95 The Supreme Judicial Court's
Stockhammer allowed defense counsel to search the evidence for witness bias, prejudice, or
motive to lie. Id.; see also Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. at 269 (requiring a showing of
legitimate need prior to in camera review).
See Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 882, 570 N.E.2d 992,
1001
(1991) (rejecting a judge's role as both a judge and advocate). In allowing the defense to
review all psychotherapy records, the SJC reasoned that "[t]he judge is not necessarily in
the best position to know what is necessary to the defense. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.
Clancy, 402 Mass. 664, 534 N.E.2d 395 (1988)).
92 Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 883-84,
570 N.E.2d 992, 1002
(1991).
Id. at 880-01, 570 N.E. 2d at 1000-01.
94Id. at 881 (recognizing a dual judicial system where different results
may occur in
state and federal courts); cf Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (requiring in
camera judicial review of evidence prior to disclosure to defense). The Supreme Judicial
Court has long recognized its independence to extend greater protection under
Massachusetts' Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 372, 476
N.E.2d 548 (1985) (recognizing Commonwealth's independence to diverge from federal
judicial reasoning).
95See Stockhammer, 409 Mass. at 881-82, 570 N.E.2d at 1001-02 (rejecting
the
federal standard requiring an in camera review of evidence). The Stockhammer court found
that the federal standard as outlined in Ritchie could not withstand close scrutiny. Id. at
882. 570 N.E.2d at 1001. The SJC acknowledged that trial judges have "broad discretion to
control the proceedings before them." Id. Specifically, the court found that a trial judge
could limit discovery of documents and allow counsel access to privileged documents "only
in their capacity as officers of the court." Id. at 883, 570 N.E.2d at 1002. Other options the
court recognized included imposing sanctions if counsel violates protective orders
guaranteeing the non-disclosure of privileged information. Id. Also, a judge could limit

80

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol.1HI

reliance on state constitutional law, rather than the federal analysis in
Ritchie, resulted in a procedural shift allowing the defendant greater power
to reach into privileged96documents before a judge performs an in camera
review of the evidence.
In 1992, one year after Stockhammer, the Supreme Judicial Court in
Commonwealth v. Figueroa97 explicitly rejected any "legitimate need"
threshold requirement as outlined in Two Juveniles.98 The Figueroacourt
found that since the credibility of a victim is a fundamental issue in a sexual assault case, all privileged records "must be made available to counsel
without any prior showing by the defendant of special circumstances demonstrating a particularized need for access to the communications." 99
The Figueroa decision enabled the defense to receive all requested
°
privileged documents without showing a legitimate need for discovery10
The Supreme Judicial Court expressed the need for trial judges to take appropriate measures to ensure that privileged information would only be
used for the limited purpose of assisting a defendant in preparing and presenting his or her defense.' 0 ' The court's vague guidelines in both

discovery to records which would not otherwise be available from other sources. Id.
96 See id. at 884, 570 N.E.2d at 1002-03 (holding defendant "entitled" to review
records privileged under state law).
413 Mass. 193, 595 N.E.2d 779 (1992).
98 Id. at 201. The court states that the decision in Figueroa "represents a departure
from the earlier rule set forth in Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles." Id.
99Id. at 202. The court acknowledged that counsel may review
the records for
evidence regarding bias, prejudice, motive to lie, as well as mental impairment. Id. This
decision expanded the Stockhammer decision which prohibited discovery concerning a
victim's mental impairment. Id. Additionally, the SJC held that the rule announced in
Stockhammer and expanded in Figueroa, should apply retroactively. Id.
10oId. at 201; see also Commonwealth v. Surgrue, 607 N.E.2d 1045, 1047-48,
34
Mass. App. Ct. 172, 174-78 (1993) (holding defense may intrude upon the absolute marital
discourse privilege); Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1156, 412 Mass. 516,
524 (1992) (permitting direct access to pre-rape mental health records); Commonwealth v.
Gautheir, 586 N.E.2d 34, 37-38, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 133-36 (1992)(allowing direct
access to child's mental health records).
101See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 413 Mass. 193, 201, 595 N.E.2d 779, 784 (1992)
(citing Commonwealth v.Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 884, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1002 (1991)
attempting to balance the defendant's and victim's interests by limiting disclosure of
privileged materials).
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Figueroa and Stockhammer afforded trial judges broad discretion in allow02
ing defense access to a victim's statutorily protected privileged records.1
03
In 1993, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Bishop1
again shifted the balance between defendant and victim rights.'0 4 The
Bishop court reaffirmed its prior holding in Two Juveniles by requiring a
defendant to show "at a minimum, a likelihood that the records contain
relevant evidence to justify initial judicial review."' 0 5 The court's departure from the Stockhammer and Figueroa decisions rests in the court's
opinion that "victims of rape or sexual abuse would likely shy away from
forthright therapeutic sessions with their [sic] counselors if 6their words
were later lent to the perpetrator in aid of his or her defense."'
An in-camera review under Bishop requires a defendant's prior
showing of need for the materials. The trial judge's role under Bishop differs from its pre-Stockhammer predecessor. 10 7 Under Bishop, the trial
judge is asked to "review and identify only relevant materials."'0 8 The
new role of the judiciary under Bishop was intended to prevent a judge
from being both advocate and adjudicator.
The Bishop court outlined a detailed five-stage procedure for trial
judges to follow when faced with a discovery request for sexual assault
victim's privileged information.' °9 In stage one, a defendant moves to
compel the production of documents.' 10 If the victim or keeper of the records refuses to produce the documents, then the judge decides whether the

102

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 176-77, 617 N.E.2d 990, 994-95 (1993)

(recognizing the need to balance the defendant and victim's competing interest). The court
abandoned the standards of Stockhammer-Figueroaand instituted a five stage protocol. Id.
at 181-85.
103 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d
990 (1993).
104Id. at 178, 617 N.E.2d at 995 (shifting defendants burden to prove
a likelihood that
the documents contain relevant evidence); cf Stockhammer, 409 Mass. at 884 (recognizing
judge as adjudicator when determining whether materials were potentially exculpatory).
105 Id.
106Id. at 176. In Bishop, the court firmly asserted that the interests of all parties
must
be recognized, and that by balancing the two sides it would ensure confidence in the trial
process as well as provide for the protection of confidential communications. Id.
107 See id. at 180 (finding the current in camera review "differs
in its design and
purpose").
108Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 180, 617 N.E.2d 990, 997 (1993).
109 See id. at 181-184 (stating five stage procedure).
1I Id. at 181.
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records qualify as privileged."' In stage two, the defendant must submit
to the judge theories regarding the relevancy of the privileged documents.
If the judge determines that the records are likely to be relevant to the defendant's defense, they will then conduct an in camera review of the
documents.
However, the court's opinion regarding at what point a
"relevant" request would allow for an in-camera review is unclear.
Stage three allows the defense counsel and prosecutor access to view
relevant material as officers of the court." 3 Counsel obtains access to determine whether disclosure of privileged information is "required to provide the defendant a fair trial."' " 4 Bishop recognized the trial judge's responsibility to ensure that access to confidential information occurred only
when "absolutely and unavoidably necessary."" 5 Stage four mandates that
defense counsel prove that disclosure of the privileged
information is re116
quired to provide the defendant with a fair trial.
If a defendant meets7
this requirement, a trial judge will permit disclosure of the material."
When the trial judge makes findings regarding which materials, if any,
should be disclosed, these findings "shall be set forth in writing [and] the
reasons for the decision [outlined] in a memorandum of decision."" 8 Additionally, if certain materials were undisclosed and the defendant is convicted of the crime and thereafter appeals, the judge should seal these materials and direct them to the reviewing court." 9 The fifth and final stage
as outlined in Bishop requires a trial judge to determine the admissibility

II'Bishop, 416 Mass. at
181.
112

See id. at 182 (requiring a judicial determination of relevancy).

113Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass.

169, 182, 617 N.E.2d 990, 998 (1993).

Although Bishop allows the defense counsel access to the privileged documents, it does so
under the defense counsel's role as an officer of the court. Id. The court stressed that "any
records so examined shall be subject to a protective order ." Id. This was necessary to
balance the victim's right to confidentiality against the defendant.
114 Id.
115 Id. In its balancing test, the SIC attempted to protect the confidentiality between
the counselor and sexual assault victim by finding that all records examined under stage
three "shall be subject to a protective order." Id. The court also emphasized this
requirement by attaching a model protective order as an appendix to the Bishop decision.
Id. at 189.
116 Id. at at 182-83.
117 See id. (holding disclosure limited to enable defendant's trial prepararation). A
judge shall only disclose information which the defendant requests in written motions. Id.
118 Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 183,617 N.E.2d 990, 998 (1996).
119 . ,
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of records introduced in a voir dire examination. 2
The court firmly
stated in its fifth stage that the trial judge should "be mindful" of the counselor-patient privilege as outlined in ch. 233 § 21B. 2 '
B. Implementing Bishop
Bishop offered trial courts a procedural device with which to determine the extent of discovery for privileged communications.122 Although
Bishop attempted to equitably balance the competing interests of the defendant and the sexual assault victim, the opinion failed to address critical
issues involving the procedural protocol to which trial courts must adhere.
Under Bishop, uncertainty remains as to whether the five stage test applies
to both conditional and absolute privileges. The Bishop case applied the
five stage test to a conditional privilege and left lower courts123 to question
whether the new rule applies to absolutely privileged records.
Another uncertainty under Bishop involved the relevancy standard
outlined in stage two. This stage is too vague and potentially overly broad
for trial courts to reasonably rely upon; consequently, it may effectuate
24
routine disclosure of confidential records in a sexual assault case.
Bishop recognized the possibility that the relevancy requirement might
tempt a defendant to put forth unfounded theories in order to satisfy a stage
two requirement. Bishop clearly articulated, however, that all theories
must be25advanced in good faith and "not merely a desperate grasping at
1
straw."
Without prior knowledge regarding the content of the privileged information, the theories regarding relevancy may become a general inquiry
using boiler-plate language. In Commonwealth v. Rape CrisisProgram of
Worcester, Inc,.126 (hereinafter "RCPW"), the Supreme Judicial Court examined the use of such boiler-plate language to persuade a court that the
defendant held relevant privileged communications involved in a rape

120

Id. The SJC noted that the five stage procedure is ongoing, and information which

is deemed to be necessary to allow a defendant to properly prepare a defense may require
future disclosure as the case progresses. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
60(1987)).
121 Id. at 183.
122 Id. at 181-183.
123 Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 174, n.2, 617 N.E.2d 990, 994 (1993).
124 See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 223-24, 667 N.E.2d 847, 853 (1996)
(recognizing the ambiguities some trial judges had experienced under the Bishop protocol).
125 Bishop, 416 Mass. at 180-81, 617 N.E.2d at 997.
126 416 Mass. 1001, 617 N.E.2d 637 (1993).
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case.
In an attempt to gain privileged information, the defendant prepared a written affidavit attesting that the records held by RCPW included
documents relevant and necessary to his client's case. 128 The court remanded the case to apply the newly established Bishop analysis to determine whether the records were privileged and if so, whether the defendant's theories regarding
relevancy would permit an in-camera review of
29
the privileged records.
C. Modifying Bishop's Effect
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Fuller,
modified the over-reaching effect inherent in stage two of Bishop.' 30 In
Fuller, the defendant sought access to counseling records held by the Rape
Crisis Center of Central Massachusetts, Inc. (hereinafter "Center").13' The
victim refused her consent for the disclosure of the Center's documents,
therefore, the Center failed to produce the documents claiming the victim
held an absolute privilege under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 233,
§20J. 32 The defendant filed a subsequent motion including three affida-

127

Id. at 1002, 617 N.E.2d at 638 (examining boiler plate language in discovery of

privileged materials). This decision was purposely released the same day and in conjunction
with Bishop. Id. at 1002. The defendant's attorney in the rape case prepared and presented
the court a written affidavit requesting access to the privileged information on the basis that
the documents "relate to the incident." Id. at 1001.
128 Id. The defense attorney's request stated
in part:
[Tlhe documents which the court ordered produced flow from the alleged
incident. As such,they clearly contain statements of the alleged victim which
related to the incident. These statements were presumably made shortly after
the incident.... Due to the alleged [victim's] failure to report the incident for
almost two months, the credibility of the alleged victim is a critical issue.
Id.; see also,Commonwealth v. Rape Crisis Services of Greater Lowell, Inc.,416 Mass. 190,
191, 617 N.E.2d 635, 636 (1993) (hereinafter "Rape Crisis") (recognizing defendant's use
of boiler plate language to gain access to absolutely privileged documents). In Rape Crisis,
the language used in defendant's memorandum to the court was practically identical to that
used in RCPW. Id. The use of such boiler plate language in a defendant's memorandum
reduces the effect of an absolute privilege where defendant's can gain access through the
application of customary discovery tools. Id.
129

Id. at 1001.

Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 218, 667 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1996)
(modifying the procedural framework of Bishop).
Id. at 217.
132 See id. (referring to the sexual assault counselor - patient privilege). Facing charges
130See
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vits seeking access to the counseling records and argued that "[t]here is a
likelihood of exculpatory evidence in the counseling records."' 133 The trial
court ruled in favor of the defendant
and ordered the Center to produce the
13 4
applicable counseling records.
The Center refused to turn over the documents asserting their belief in
a statutory and constitutionally protected right of privacy. 35 The Center
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe articulated a
privacy interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."' 36 In its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized a federal precedent for a
constitutionally protected right to confidentiality. 37 The court rejected
of rape, indecent exposure, and lewd and lascivious behavior charges, the defendant sought
the victim's counseling records held by the center. Id. The defense learned of the victim's
counseling history through a pretrial agreement. Id. at 218. The defendant filed the motion
requesting the documents before a judge in the Superior Court. Id. In response to the
defense's motion, the judge ordered the Center to produce all records of the victims
counseling at the Center. Id. The Center reported to the judge that the documents requested
were privileged under § 20J and that the victim had not waived her privilege. Id. The
Center was charged with contempt for their failure to produce the requested documents, and
a single justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court stayed the judgment pending an appeal
of the ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
133 Id. at 219. The defendant's request alleged that because the victim
was involved in
a previous similar incident in 1991 and received counseling from the center, that those
records may contain exculpatory statements by the complainant. Id. Also, the defense
believed the fact that the victim was embarrassed when discovered by the police officer at
the scene might provide the victim with a motive to lie about the incident with the
defendant. Id. The defense argued that "[t]here is a probability that evidence which is
relevant to the issue will appear in the counseling records." Id.
Id. at 220.
135 See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass 216, 220-21, 617 N.E.2d
847, 851-52
(1996) (arguing disclosure of client counseling records is prohibited under a constitutionally
protected privacy interest).
136 Id. at 220, 617 N.E.2d at 851 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977)).
The Center argued that a constitutionally protected privacy interests must receive greater
protection than a common law privilege such as the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 220-21.
In the alternative, the Center asked the SJC to consider applying strict scrutiny to cases
where the defendant seeks a victim's counseling record. Id. at 221, 617 N.E.2d at 852. The
Center outlined a two stage process where the defendant would hold the burden of proving
(1) the victim has intentionally attempted to "distort the truth-finding process" and (2) "the
defendant has a compelling need for access to particular information." Id.
137See id. at 222 , 617 N.E.2d at 853 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. at 599)
(recognizing an individual's privacy interest in certain personal matters).
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drawing an analogy to ch. 233, §20J because "[tihe precise nature and
scope of the.., right is rather ill-defined."' 131 While the court recognized
a strong societal interest in protecting the confidential communications
between sexual assault victims and their counselors, the court elected not
to decide whether
a complainant has a constitutionally protected right of
39
confidentiality.
The Supreme Judicial Court maintained its holding that the sexual
assault counselor-patient privilege is statutorily based.' 40 The court restated the opinion "that in certain circumstances a defendant must have
access to... records [protected under § 20J] so as not to undermine confidence in the outcome of trial.' 41 The Supreme Judicial Court's decision
to balance competing interests affirmed its central holding in Bishop by
requiring a procedural framework for trial judges to apply when faced with
requests for privileged information requests. 42 The court recognized inherent 43
faults in the Bishop opinion and drafted a more precise test in
1
Fuller.

Fuller resolved the ambiguity in Bishop regarding whether to apply
the test to conditional and absolute privileges. Fuller held that the procedural five stage rule applies to any type of asserted privilege (emphasis
added).144 Now, whenever a defendant seeks to encroach upon a victim's
statutorily protected privilege he or she must follow the standard outlined
in Bishop and modified in Fuller.

138 Id. (quoting Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 (11th Cir. 1991)). The SJC

concluded that the confidential records protected by constitutional provisions were
"factually different from the class of records involved here." Id.
139 See id. at 223 (recognizing a victim's confidentiality rights are statutory).
140 Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 222, 617 N.E.2d 847, 853 (1996). The
SJC followed the majority of courts by applying a balancing test and recognizing that a
victim's statutory right to confidentiality must be weighed against a defendant's
constitutional rights. Id.; see also Two Juveniles, 397 Mass at 266 (finding MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 233, § 20J a "nonconstitutionally based testimonial privilege").
141Fuller, 423 Mass at 223 (quoting Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 176, 617 N.E.2d
990(1993)).
142 Id. at 223-24. The procedural test attempted to "strike the proper
balance between
the rights involved." Id. at 224.
143 See id. at 224 (recognizing difficulties in the Bishop
test).
144 Id. The SJC found that the Bishop and RCPW decisions "plainly indicate[] that this
court intended the Bishop standard and protocol to apply when a defendant seeks access to
any privileged records, including those protected by § 20J." Id.
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Most importantly, Fuller attempted to resolve the inadequacies in
Bishop's stage two. Stage two analysis under Bishop required a relevancy
determination by the judge where the defendant puts forth theories regarding the possible relevancy of the privileged documents.' 45 Fuller recognized that some judges have weighted the scale in favor of the privilege
holder and required the defendant to "make a substantial threshold showing to obtain in camera inspection of privileged records."'6 On the other
end of the spectrum, some judges have given the term "relevance" exceedingly broad meaning and allowed in-camera review of privileged documents after meeting a minimal threshold. 47
Fuller recognized that a standard which resulted in "virtually automatic" in-camera review of privileged records "would make the privilege
no privilege at all . . . ."14 The court found that a sexual assault victim
who seeks treatment will likely speak to the counselor regarding the incident.' 49 The court firmly stated that merely because the communications
relate to the incident is not enough to allow for disclosure, rather, a defendant must demonstrate that the communications are "likely to be relevant
to an issue in the case."' 50 The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that if
a defendant could summarily meet the relevancy standard, then sexual assault victims may elect not to receive beneficial counseling.' 51
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that a "literal application" of
the Bishop test would result in orders from trial courts compelling the production of most privileged records. 52 The Supreme Judicial Court held the
"likely to be relevant" standard used in Bishop was too broad. 5 3 Additionally, the court recognized that the likelihood the discovered material
would 4assist the defendant in avoiding an erroneous conviction is re15
mote.

145 See Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 181-82, 617 N.E.2d 990, 997-98 (articulating stage
two

protocol).
146Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 224, 667 N.E.2d 847, 853
(1996).
147Id.(citing

J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice at 206-07 (1975)).

148 Id.
149 See id. at 221-222 (recognizing role of sexual assault counseling).

Id. at 224-25.
151

See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 221-22, 667 N.E.2d 847, 851-52

(1996) (recognizing the importance of sexual assault counseling).
152 Id. at 225.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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The court reasoned that disclosure of confidential documents, especially those involving counseling records of sexual assault victims, "should
not become the general exception to the rule of confidentiality."' 5 5 The
Supreme Judicial Court recognized the unlikelihood that sexual assault
counseling records would contain evidence material to the defendant's
guilt or innocence which can not be located from other sources. 156 Therefore, the protocol and standard for their discovery must be analyzed under
this premise.
The Fullerdecision re-emphasized the duty of the defendant to supply
the court with a motion regarding the discovery of privileged records prior
to issuing a summons for the material. 57 In addition, a motion concerning
discovery of privileged documents "should be the last step in a defendant's
pretrial discovery."'158 The court's emphasis on using this protocol supports the court's core belief that encroaching upon a victim's statutory
right of confidentiality is a "substantial
invasion" which ought to be used
59
only in limited circumstances.'
The defendant's motion requesting the production of privileged
documents must demonstrate "a good faith, specific and reasonable basis
for believing that the records will contain exculpatory evidence which is
relevant and material to the issue of the defendant's guilt."' 16 This new
standard attempts to avoid the ambiguities of Bishop by applying a clearer
and heightened standard of review. The Supreme Judicial Court provides
greater clarity by defining some of these terms to avoid ambiguities prevalent in its prior cases. For example, "material evidence" is defined to mean
"evidence which is likely to meet criteria of admissibility, but which also
tends to create a reasonable doubt that might not otherwise exist."' 6 1 In an
attempt to clearly articulate a new standard, the Supreme Judicial Court
gave examples
of what types of theories might penetrate a privileged rec16 2
ord.
Id.
156

Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 225, 667 N.E.2d 847, 854 (1996).

157

Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 225-26.

158

161

Id. at 226.
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 226, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (1996)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 17, 21, 502 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1987)).
162Id. The court found that instances where a victim had previously
fabricated
allegations of sexual assault, shown bias against the defendant, or demonstrated difficulty
distinguishing fantasy from reality "might warrant in camera inspection of a complainant's
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The Supreme Judicial Court's holding in Fuller adhered to the core
principle in Bishop that the defendant must not gain "unrestrained foray
into confidential records in the hope that the unearthing of some unspecified information would enable [the defendant] to impeach the witness.' 63
The court rejected the argument that this new standard improperly limits a
defendant's state and federal constitutional rights. 64 The court, examining
the trend in sister states, found that the majority of courts faced with this
issue have "required a threshold showing before a privilege is abrogated."' 65 The Supreme Judicial Court further concluded that "[i]n its
application, the Bishop-Fuller protocol should not differ significantly
in its
66
application from the 'legitimate need' standard of Two Juveniles."'
The Supreme Judicial Court first applied this new standard and protocol under the facts of Fuller. In Fuller, the defendant sought access to the
victim's record claiming that her embarrassment in "getting caught" might
"be relevant to show the [victim's] propensity to lie."'' 67 The court found
that the defendant failed to meet this new threshold showing. The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that even if the victim had a motive to lie,
the defendant failed to show that the counseling records
contained evi68
dence which would not be available from another source.'
The Supreme Judicial Court , in its 1997 term, squarely faced the issue of an absolute privilege between a domestic violence counselor and his
or her patient. In Commonwealth v. Tripolone, the Supreme Judicial Court
re-affirmed the newly established Bishop-Fuller protocol and recognized
the need to balance these conflicting interests. 69 In Tripolone, the defendant requested that New Hope, Inc., a center addressing the needs of victims of domestic violence, turn over the victim's counseling records for an
in-camera review to determine the existence of potentially exculpatory

rape counseling records." Id.
163 Id. at 26-27 (citing Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 182, 617 N.E.2d

990, 997 (1993)).
164

Id. at 227. The SJC recognized that "[tlhe Federal and the State Constitutions do

not require a more liberal right of access to absolutely privileged records." Id.
165 Id. at 226-27; see also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 178 n.5, 617
N.E.2d 990,995, n.5 (1993); People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 670-73, 521 N.W.2d 557,
586 (1994).
166Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 226-27, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (1996);
see
generallyCommonwealth v.Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 491 N.E.2d 234 (1985).
167 Fuller, 423 Mass. at 227.
168 See id. at 228 (denying defendant's request for production of documents).
169 See Commonwealth v. Tripolone, 425 Mass. 487, 681 N.E.2d 1216 (1997).
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After the Center refused to comply, a Superior Court judge

7
entered an order of contempt against the Center.' '

On appeal before the Supreme Judicial Court, the court vacated the
lower court's decision and held that the trial court was required to apply
the new Bishop-Fuller analysis to this case. 72 The Supreme Judicial
Court's opinion supports its core holding in Fuller that it "would not allow
a standard that 'would result in virtually automatic in camera inspection
for an entire class of extremely private and sensitive privileged material.' 73 The Supreme Judicial Court, in its holding, required future courts
to apply the Bishop-Fuller protocol which, as articulated in Fuller, requires
the defendant to prove that the desired materials potentially contain 7excul4
patory evidence that is relevant and material to the defendant's guilt.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Commonwealth v.Tripolone'", the Supreme Judicial Court's most
recent opinion addressing discovery of potentially exculpatory material,
the court endorsed the procedural effectiveness of the Bishop-Fullerprotocol. In Tripolone, the Supreme Judicial Court clearly expressed its support
of the new Bishop-Fuller test and used the decision to lend credibility to
the court's new, well-defined, direction. This new protocol will aid litigants and practitioners to clearly define the parameters and procedure for
discovery of potentially exculpatory evidence.
As the Supreme Judicial Court recognized, the Bishop's decision, potentially permitting access to all relevant communications, was overly
broad and neglected a more precise goal of releasing documents which
were solely necessary for defendant's trial preparation. The Fuller decision attacked the vague second step in Bishop's five-prong analysis and
attempted to add weight, strength, and protection for the confidential counselor-patient relationship. The Bishop-Fuller heightened standard offers
the courts a more coherent analysis, recognizes the defendant's constitutional rights, as well as the statutory confidentiality rights of the victim.
Under the new Bishop-Fuller standard, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-

170

Id. at 488.
Id. at 487.

Id. at 488-89.
173Id. at 489 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 224, 667 N.E.2d
847,
854 (1996)).
172

174Commonwealth

v.Tripolone, 425 Mass. 487, 489, 681 N.E.2d 1216, 1218(1997)

(quoting Fuller).
175 425 Mass. 487, 681 N.E.2d 1216 (1997).
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cial Court has successfully developed a delicate balancing test which equitably recognizes the constitutional rights of a defendant and protects
against the random disclosure of a victim's confidential records.
Adrienne Kotowski

